

Re-imagining democracy in Latin –America and the Caribbean

Minutes: 14/6/2016

Present: **Eduardo Posada Carbo, Mark Philp, Tony McFarlane, Rebeca Viguera-Ruiz, John Elliot, Maurizio Isabella, Guy Thomson, Sarah Washbrook, Alan Knight, Peter Hill, Tom Long, Halbert Jones, Viviana Mellone, Michael Drolet, and Andrew Asseraf**

**EPC** introduced the session as a new branch of the wider Re-imagining Democracy Project, and **MP** said something about the wider project and its interest both in changes in language and concepts and changes in institutions and practices.

**T. McFarlane (TM)** introduced the session by some remarks on the:

### **Bourbon Reforms and Late Colonial Rebellions**

Three main parts: - Origins and character of the Bourbon succession to the Habsburg empire; Caroline reforms and their effects; Spanish American rebellions and their significance.

#### **1. Bourbon monarchy:**

The historiography on the Spanish monarchy under Bourbon rule has tended to define that monarchy in terms of the 'Bourbon reforms'. Historians generally accept that the dominant characteristic of the Bourbon century, starting during the War of Spanish Succession, was the attempt to reshape the monarchy, turning the composite monarchy of the Habsburgs into a more unitary, centralised monarchy. After the failure of the Spanish Habsburgs to sustain an 'imperial realm' composed of a conglomeration of diverse peoples and states, the new dynasty tried to remake Spain as a centralized 'kingly state' in the image of France.

The main driver for reform was determination to restore the power and prestige of the Spanish monarchy among its European rivals, mainly by finding the means to meet the strategic demands of international warfare.

#### ***Origins and development of Bourbon government: main phases?***

Historiography is tilted towards the second half of the eighteenth century, to the reigns of Carlos III (1759-88) and his immediate successor Carlos IV (1788-1808). Recent historiography has revised this bias. Kuethe and Andrien (2014) have shown that the early Bourbon period saw crucial changes to the institutions of the Spanish state, debate and discussion around new ideas, and early experiments conducted in military, fiscal and economic reform (by Alberoni, 1715-19, Patiño in the 1730s, and Ensenada in the 1740s.) Nevertheless, the Caroline period, especially the reign of Carlos III, still stands out as a time when institutional reform reached beyond the ambition of the first Bourbon kings. In shifting from the early Bourbons' preoccupation with Spain and Europe towards a concentration on the resources and governance of Spanish America, the Caroline kings showed a new concern to construct a unitary state that embraced Spain's overseas possessions and went some way towards securing it. Vigorous economic growth, territorial

expansion, major institutional reform, political upheaval and cultural innovation are all more evident in the second half of the Bourbon century than the first.

### ***Salient features of Bourbon government across the century?***

- Openness to foreign ideas, and tendency to blend traditional approaches with models drawn from abroad. This was particularly obvious in the opening years of Philip V, when French advocacy for reform of the traditional constitutional order merged with ideas drawn from the prolonged discussion of Spain's decline that had taken place in Habsburg Spain. Philip V, urged on by Louis XIV's advisors, embarked on the institutional reforms that were to inaugurate the conversion of the Habsburg 'imperial realm' into the more dynamic and successful form of the 'kingly state' so triumphantly represented by Bourbon France. He initiated Spain's transformation from the 'horizontal' form of the composite monarchy into the 'vertical' state of an unitary monarchy.
- Encouragement to Spanish intellectuals and statesmen to articulate new ways of thinking about the nature of royal authority, and new policies to strengthen and sustain that authority. (Development of arguments that the king had a duty to promote the material welfare of his subjects, rather than simply providing order and justice; that the king's strength relied on the well-being of his subjects; that the king's responsibility for the common good entailed intervention to achieve economic and cultural progress by reform of commerce and education. Also specific policies connected commerce and economic growth emerged from the writings of several theorists and statesmen of the period: e.g. Ustáriz argued for reforms to Spain's mercantilist laws, so that an 'active' (i.e. export-led) trade would stimulate growth in Spain's agriculture and manufactures; also anticipated later Bourbon policy by suggesting that the crown should establish new institutions to promote economic, technical and scientific advance.)
- Emphasis on Spanish America was prominent theme of these writings. By mid-century, conventional thinking in governing circles that Spain had to make the transition from an 'empire of conquest' to an 'empire of commerce', together with a belief that the crown should nurture the prosperity of its subjects by government interventions and policies that would reshape the conditions in which trade, agriculture and industry were conducted.
- Equally striking were attacks on the independence of the Church: edicts for the secularization of parishes held by the regular orders in Mexico and Peru were key moves in the Bourbon regalistic strategy aimed at altering the balance of Church-state in favour of the monarchy.

### ***Character of reforms?***

- Creation of new structures of government, to place more power in the hands of the king and his ministers, while taking it away from his most powerful subjects. Starting under Felipe V, Bourbon ministers made a continuing effort to construct more centralized government, more efficient fiscalization, a more active 'national' mercantilist policy, and a growing 'regalist' assertion of the crown's rights over the Church. During the first half of the eighteenth century, this was felt mainly in Spain itself but Spanish America was also affected.
- Strengthening Spain's capacity to project military power. Philip V created the essential attribute of a successful kingly state: namely, a standing army based on Spanish territory and controlled by professional officers whose careers depended on the king. This was a building block of Philip V's new state, the beginnings, according to some historians, of a 'military monarchy' quite different from its predecessors. In Lynch's view, the growth of the army tended to benefit the higher aristocracy, so that in Spain, unlike other European states, the army became 'the vanguard of the aristocracy, not its rival'.

Historians continue to debate the extent of progress made by reformers around mid-century, but it is clear that, at Fernando VI's death in 1759, Spain had moved significantly closer to being a 'kingly state'. A more centralized structure of government had partly replaced the old conciliar system; secretaries of state chosen by the king directed policy; men from provincial and military backgrounds increasingly occupied important posts in the administrative system; ministers were beginning to assert greater royal authority over Spain's colonies, particularly over the Church. Spain's military and naval capacity had improved too, and the end of the *asiento* and partial dismantling of the fleet system opened better prospects for combating competition in Spanish American trade.

But considerable scope for reform remained: Spanish monarchy was still far from replicating its absolutist model in France. In practice, the king lacked full command of the nobility, and aristocratic factions retained an ability to obstruct royal policies. Secondly, though there had been some tightening of control through the viceroys, institutional reform was less potent in Spanish America than Spain. Thirdly, old mercantile interests still stood in the way of major reform of the system which regulated Spain's colonial commerce, blocking the connections with American markets that were vital for the development of Spain's economy. Finally, Spain still seemed rather isolated from the scientific and cultural advances of eighteenth century: both foreign and domestic critics regarded it as a society mired in tradition, awaiting reform from above at the hand of an enlightened monarch.

### **2. The Caroline reforms and their repercussions**

The accession of Carlos III seems to mark a new departure: inaugurated a king who, as ruler of Naples and Sicily, had acquired a taste for innovation and ministers to implement it.

The catalyst for rapid action came from outside, from the external shock that emanated from Spanish and French defeats in the Seven Years' War. Britain's capture of Havana and Manila, combined with its even greater success in seizing Canada from France, made it clear that the key problem which confronted Charles III was essentially the same as that faced by his father Philip V at the end of the War of the Spanish Succession: namely, how to organize and mobilize the resources of his possessions so that Spain was able successfully to compete with its major European rivals. As in the first half of the eighteenth century, this entailed adjustments to the constitution of the Spanish monarchy, this time through the erosion of local autonomy and the construction of a more centralized structure of government in Spanish America.

The new focus on America was partly the outcome of resistance to reform in Spain itself, signalled in the Esquilache riots of 1766, which forced the king to abandon Esquilache's plans for reform and the minister himself (Stein & Stein, 2003). But also followed from the obvious fact that Spain's prosperity and defence of its empire depended largely on American resources. Thus, a significant change of emphasis under Carlos III, signalled by the *Reglamento de comercio libre*. Applied to South America first, then to Mexico in 1789, the 1778 decree marked a major change in the system of colonial commerce. In accord with the recommendations made by Campillo and others, the crown finally recognized that channels of trade had to be enlarged, and that the customs system was best used as a means to promote Spanish trade and products over foreign competitors, rather than simply as a source of income for the royal treasury.

The shift of emphasis towards closer control over Spanish American subjects and their resources was evident in other spheres too, in the military system and most importantly in the system of government in Spanish America. Reform began in the 1760s with the creation of an intendancy in Cuba and the *visita general* of New Spain by José de Gálvez. It then became more extensive with the creation of the new Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata in 1776, and, after José de Gálvez became Minister of the Indies, the *visitas generales* which took place in the major South American territories in the late 1770s and early 1780s. These brought many changes to administration and taxation and prepared the way for the widespread introduction in Spanish America of the system of intendancies. These were also years in which the power of the regular orders came under fresh attack, with the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767 and renewal of the secularization of Indian parishes.

In these reforms, we see efforts to strengthen the state in Spain extended to America. American *audiencias* were purged to reduce local influence; intendants were implanted, region by region, to act as the king's executive officers in military, political and economic matters; the tax system was altered to ensure a larger fiscal yield.

Finally, we can see the new focus on America in another distinctive feature of the later Bourbon period: the crown's growing engagement in the development and dissemination of scientific discovery within Spain's realms. This cultivation of 'natural history' had multiple aims: to dispel Spain's image in Europe as an intellectual backwater; to strengthen and vindicate the monarchy; to facilitate exploitation of natural resources which would stimulate Spanish trade and industry. It was implemented in crown support for what might

now be called 'soft power' policies, designed to win support for government by promoting cultural change. These included the patronage of scientific projects designed to promote and display knowledge of American resources and to stimulate their exploitation; the modernization of university curricula to encourage study of the natural sciences; the encouragement for a new periodical press to foster the spread of 'useful knowledge', conducive to economic and social development.

As Spanish policy became more 'colonial' in its orientation, Bourbon reform had powerful effects in Spanish America, and on Spain's relations with its overseas territories. This was most obvious in the commercial sphere, where the Caroline reforms helped to enlarge the value and volume of colonial commerce. (Though not ultimately successful in providing a framework for sustaining the model of export-led development of Spanish manufactures, before being choked off in 1796 by the onset of twelve years of almost continuous war with Britain.)

The story of state finances was somewhat similar. Growth of American revenues allowed Spain a 'gradual transition to a more modern and powerful military and fiscal state' (Marichal, 2007). Bourbon success in squeezing its colonies for taxes was not, however, ultimately to save Spain's empire.

What of the political repercussions of Bourbon reform in Spanish America, where government had traditionally been more lax than in Spain? They certainly provoked stronger and more widespread antagonism in Spanish America than in Spain. In Spain, anti-reform surfaced dangerously in the 1766 '*motín de Esquilache*' in Madrid. Driven by temporary merger of aristocratic counter-reform and popular discontents, Madrid riots toppled the king's chosen minister. The king's defeat was disguised by scapegoating the Jesuits, who were expelled from Spain's realms in 1767, marking a bold advance in Bourbon efforts to reduce the power of the Church.

### **3. Rebellion**

#### ***Chronology and geography of rebellion in Bourbon Spanish monarchy?-***

In Spain, there was no great opposition to Bourbon government after War of Spanish Succession. Catalans and other allies of the Habsburg candidate were defeated in war; after the war, Philip V had substantial military power. In Spanish America, there was little opposition to Bourbon succession, and social and political peace was sustained without substantial difficulty. This equilibrium was sustained after the succession, mainly because the incoming Bourbon ministers focused their reforming efforts on Spain rather than Spanish America. Recent work has shown that there were some attempts to reform government, such as the creation of the Viceroyalty of New Granada in 1717-21, and reforms to the army. (Kuethe & Andrien, 2014). But first Viceroyalty of New Granada was short-lived, as were attempts to reform the American *audiencias* by introducing new personnel.

Rebellion was rare in Spanish America until the reign of Charles III (1759-1788). Expulsion of Jesuits met with some dissent in Mexico, suppressed by José de Gálvez, then *visitador*

*general* in New Spain (subsequently the principal champion of colonial reform as Minister of the Indies (1776-87).

Greatest reactions against Charles's reforms occurred in Spanish South America, where general inspections (*visitas generales*) and administrative and fiscal innovations provoked dissent on an unprecedented scale: Quito rebellion of 1765; the Comuneros' rebellion in New Granada (1780); the Tupac Amaru rebellion or 'great Andean rebellion' in Peru and Upper Peru (1780-82).

Tendency to interpret them primarily as reactions against Bourbon reforms to government, trade and taxation. At the time, some Spanish officials blamed José de Gálvez, the minister of the Indies for the rebellions, which they saw as results of his insensitive and impolitic measures; historians have broadly concurred.

### ***Explaining the rebellions***

Major rebellions differed in socio-economic settings and in social composition; also varied in scale, scope, duration, and impact. However, had some shared features:-

- On a larger scale than any previous rebellions, and involved cross-class, cross-race alliances
- Reflected the hierarchical character of their societies
- Convergence of popular and elite grievances
- Led by creoles and/or Indian nobles
- Triggered by Bourbon administrative and fiscal innovations and aimed to reverse reforms.
- New or increased taxation was a particularly potent driver of popular antagonism and insurrection. In Peru and Upper Peru, also high point in cycle of protests from indigenous peasant communities against forced labour system (*mita*) and forced trade (*reparto de mercancías*).
- Grievances were political as well as economic: among elites, common thread of belief that Americans had right to participate in their own governance. Gálvez's reforms were a shock because Bourbon reforms had previously had limited impact on governance in Spanish America. (Important *audiencias* still had large, sometimes dominant creole membership in early 1770s, and even where peninsular judges were present, the American influence could still be strong: e.g. the presence of 'creolized' officials on the *Audiencia de Santafe*: i.e. long-serving Spaniards closely associated with leading creole families in Bogotá. Similar phenomenon in Quito in 1764-5, where judges of the *audiencia* were linked to aristocratic creole families in the city. Theoretically, family and business ties were prohibited, but in practice not prevented: hence ties between Spanish officials and creole patricians tended to

support shared ideas about government, based on Habsburg practices of government.) Creole elites in particular objected to Bourbon violation of the Habsburg 'unwritten constitution' which had allowed corporate bodies to negotiate informally over legislation, while also allowing Americans to hold office in the lands of their birth. Their objections were couched in a political and juridical language that defended American autonomy and access to office. This imposed constraints on the rebellions' development and impact, for they were not forward-looking movements. Their leaders justified rebellion as a defence of the constitutional order of the Habsburg monarchy and did not contemplate an alternative form of constitution, despite the contemporary example of the American Revolution in British North America. (Raises question of how much Spanish Americans knew about North American rebellion). [Evidence? – e.g. Quito rebellion in 1765: *Audiencia* judges resented external intrusions and saw themselves as the true voice of government: they saw government in terms of Habsburg practices of 'bureaucratic negotiation', whereby important local interests (e.g. cabildos, leading ecclesiastics) were allowed to respond to new measures. (reference to respect local customs and interests as in respect for provincial *fueros* in Spain itself.) The representation made to the king by the Mexico City council in 1772 (Lynch, ed. 1994) explicitly expresses the concept of the Spanish monarchy as composed of separate kingdoms, where local patricians could rightly expect preference in government appointments because of their birth and heritage, and their better knowledge of, and greater interest in the public good of the societies in which they were born and raised. Evidence of similar attitudes among creoles in the Comunero rebellion in New Granada in 1781, in the text called '*nuestra cédula*' which circulated among Comuneros, as well as in the *capitulaciones* their leaders submitted for negotiation. (Phelan, 1978) Further evidence of recourse to traditional conception of government similar to that of the Comuneros found in Andean rebellions of 1780-82 . Tupac Amaru rebellion in Cuzco region began with ceremony to depose Corregidor in public ceremony with fake royal order to justify his execution, all in King's name. (Walker, 2014) The Tomas Katari rebellion in Chayanta also reflected this conception: it started with public ceremony to depose the Corregidor, in culmination of long legal struggle to reduce burdens of *mita* and *reparto*. (Serulnikov, 2003)]

- Popular rebellion: patterns of behaviour and attitudes? - Note relationship between these uprisings and long-standing popular traditions of legal and extra-legal protest: e.g. in New Granada, Comuneros' rebellion can be related to traditions of political actions in towns and villages which were regarded as illegal, but were perceived as extra-legal by the actors. They were of many kinds, but invariably preceded by legal action and tended to break out when justice was seen to fail (McFarlane, HHR 1984). These and the growing number of Andean Indian community revolts and protests can be understood via concept of the 'moral economy' of peasants (EP

Thompson; James Scott), where actors perceived their illegal actions to be justified because the authorities broke old and established rules and threatened to take more than fair share of peasant surplus. (Scarlett O'Phelan for Peru; Segundo Moreno for Ecuador; Serulnikov and Sinclair Thomson for Upper Peru.) Hence the need to see the large regional and trans-regional rebellions in the context of smaller riots and rebellions which came before and after.

- Revolutionary potential for transformation of large rebellions? In some respects, they were conservative and backward looking: Comuneros' slogan 'Long live the King and down with bad government' reflected a belief in monarchy based on a pact between king and people; belief that it was legitimate to defend traditional rights against monarchical encroachment, by force if necessary; a propensity to see monarchical encroachment as the result of 'bad ministers' and corruption in government. Tendency for rebellions to be carried out in the king's name also found among indigenous communities who rebelled in Peru and Upper Peru. Comuneros leaders and Tupac Amaru aimed to restore an order that they believed had been overturned by ill-advised ministers, and they called on the king to rectify the error. They did not wish to overturn the monarchy but to be better represented within it, in traditional terms: that is, not through autonomous assemblies as in North America but through access to government posts.

### ***Andean rebellion: special features?***

'Tupac Amaru rebellion' not homogeneous, united movement, but several distinctive rebellions based on different regions, different indigenous cultures and different dynamics. Better called the 'great Andean rebellion' to reflect the fact that it arose from several rebellions. One was led by Tupac Amaru in Cuzco region; one by Tomas Katari and his brothers in Chayanta region (Upper Peru or modern Bolivia) and another by Tupac Katari in La Paz region.

Tupac Amaru rebellion shaped by character of the Cuzco region, an Andean region with distinctive history and society. Two special features:

First, presence of an Indian nobility with prestige and power; they had strong contacts with creole and mestizo groups, which recognised Indian nobles. Tupac Amaru and his peers were bilingual and literate, and linked by kinship networks to provincial ethnic chiefs. Tupac Amaru himself claimed descent from the last Inca king, executed in late 16c, and pursued this title through the Spanish courts. He was also cacique of Indian peasant communities, and presented himself as champion of Indians in grievances against fiscal and labour impositions.

Second, existence of a cult of Inca past, and a messianic discourse about a golden age in the Inca past: this penetrated Indian populace through beliefs in cycles of history, in which sudden cataclysms would invert the normal order. These beliefs were present in Indian community culture, and were activated politically during rebellion (Szeminski). When

leaders promoted idea of Inca restoration, peasants saw chance to act on their socioeconomic grievances and resentment against Spaniards. The history of the Incas implied the existence of an alternative order; the idea of sudden reversals made the overthrow of existing order seem politically possible.

Cuzco rebellion mobilised thousands but was soon defeated in its heartland. Leaders sought cross-race alliances that disintegrated as soon as peasant intentions were revealed. Tupac Amaru himself ambiguous. Difficult to see Tupac Amaru as radical, anti-Spanish leader from the outset of his rebellion; perhaps became more overtly radical after his failure take Cuzco [in Jan 1781] and feeling that he had been betrayed by whites. But historians have generally agreed on deep ambiguity of Tupac Amaru's discourse, as reflected in his orders and edicts and gleaned from interrogations on his behaviour. He had at least two distinctive discourses.

One aimed at creoles and mestizos and Spanish officials (called for greater autonomy for Indians via Indian leaders like himself; also called for greater autonomy for creoles and mestizos through new government (a viceroy and *audiencia*) in Cuzco, separate from Lima government. Other discourse directed at the mass of his Indian followers. They were mostly Indian *comuneros* (traditional peasant communities under Indian caciques); in Cuzco region, they were organised in clans under ethnic chiefs, who were empowered to represent them in dealings with the Spanish state. Tupac Amaru gained their support through his kinship links with other caciques and through discourse that promised the redress of their grievances against colonial prestations and white supremacy.

Indians had chance of identifying with Inca myth and larger 'Indian nation' (to which Tupac Amaru referred), but divided by loyalties to clan groupings. Confirmed by fact that Indian commoners sided with rebels or anti-rebels according to choices of their caciques. Maybe Tupac Amaru and his followers were radicalised in course of rebellion. At first, documents from Tupac Amaru stress loyalty to king; such references then less frequent after massacre at Sangarara and retreat from Cuzco (when Tupac Amaru has portrait of himself and wife painted in regalia of Inca kings). But rebellion also revealed absence of military capacity: defeats demoralised Indians and undermined hope in new future.

The rebellions south of Cuzco were different. Tomas Katari and Tupac Katari had no reason to accept the authority of Inca Tupac Amaru: they were from different culture, language group and tradition; they had not been subject to hereditary nobility in same way as Cuzco groupings; they were often in conflict with their *caciques*, who had ceased to be hereditary and were often mestizos without ethnic identity or standing. While *caciques* were respected as community leaders in Cuzco, not so in southern regions, where Indian commoners wanted more community participation in choice of its leaders. They sought local autonomy as they always had, but under leaders of their own choosing. (Serulnikov and Thomson on the distinctive character of political culture among Indian communities in Upper Peru: communal base and tended towards democratisation). Chayanta region rebellions were not triggered by conspiracy as in case of Tupac Amaru, but arose from longstanding struggles (appeals to law and small-scale riots and revolts) over at least preceding decade. More a chain of rebellions than mobilisation of rebel army; a process of collective mobilisation

among Aymara communities, in which Indians undermined Spanish authority in countryside and felt gradual sense of empowerment. (Serulnikov).

Rebellion of La Paz led by Tupac Katari different again. Made brief alliance with creoles of Oruro, but movement not led by Indian caciques nor built on structure of communities. Did not aim at independence; goal more radical in aiming at eliminating white supremacy and reclaiming the land. More effective militarily, but ultimately defeated by internal divisions.

### ***What was effect of rebellions on the Spanish monarchy?***

The rebellion in New Granada and the Andean insurrections were very worrying for Spanish ministers and officials. This was a time when Spain's government was very sensitive to the dangers that might arise from colonial rebellion, since it was giving supporting Britain's North American subjects in their war of independence which had its roots in tax reforms. But neither of these two regional rebellions turned into wars for independence.

Explanations?

- Different societies of British and Spanish American colonies.
- Different political cultures: North America rebellion also sparked by fiscal reforms and British colonials also drew on traditional ideas. Linked to political protest in England, to republican traditions of Civil War, and from the radical Whigs 'country' ideology of opposition to tyranny; they had representative institutions and built networks of communication between colonial protestors (which enabled them to imagine a larger community between the colonies and against the metropole). British American thinking also radicalised in course of anti-government mobilisation; infused by new ideas in course of conflict e.g. Tom Paine.
- Spanish Americans were more geographically (and culturally) isolated than the thirteen colonies, and could not make contacts with foreign powers which British American rebels immediately sought.

If the Spanish American rebellions did not become revolutions, did they nonetheless weaken Spanish authority? In the short term, few signs that they did. In New Granada, negotiations suspended reforms temporarily, but did not prevent tax rises or gradual diminution of creole influence in government. However, the introduction of intendants system did not happen; it was postponed, and, though there were occasional discussions about its revival, remained a dead letter. New Granada thus only major area where intendants system not implemented. On the other hand, rebellion strengthened hand of reformers; persuaded some that they should tighten social discipline, and enhance creoles' sense of belonging to Spanish monarchy.

In Peru and Upper Peru, rebellions also achieved some of their goals. Offending officials were removed (notably Areche) and an *audiencia* was created for Cuzco. On the other hand, reformers used rebellion as reminder of need to push ahead with important reforms. They continued with plan to abandon the old system of the 'two republics', eliminating the

'Indian republic' in favour of a fully Spanish society. Aim was to incorporate Indians as peasantry into the reformed monarchy. Serulnikov argues that the post rebellion reforms led to hispanization of Indian peasantry, though this less marked in Upper Peru than in Peru. In Bolivia, Indian peasant communities survived and continued to provide bases for peasant action against landlords and state; they continued to seek accommodation with state, most notably in seeking to retain system of colonial prestations in return for self-government (Platt;Thomson).

If the rebellions temporarily disrupted the progress of reform, they did not deflect the crown from its goal of creating a more unified and centralized monarchy, nor permanently destabilize the empire. Indeed, they were a warning to the crown of the vitality of the old political culture and thus an encouragement to undertake social and cultural reforms designed to promote social discipline and promote loyalty.

Thus a distinctive feature of reform after the rebellions was the extension to Spanish America of plans to reorder society and change political culture, reflected on two planes.

One was has called the 'civilizing project', a group of urban reforms aimed at increasing state control over the lower classes (Walker). This had several facets: extension of the regalist attack on Church power; the attempt, extended from reforms implemented in Spanish cities such as Madrid, to impose closer control over the organization and infrastructure of Spanish American cities, in order to promote the growth and improve the policing of the urban population. Bourbon social policy also reached into the heart of society, sometimes with contradictory effects. On the one hand, there were new rules which allowed free people of colour to buy 'whiteness', with its attendant privileges, which seemed to aim at encouraging homogeneity in the population. On the other, new Bourbon legislation on marriage provided whites with the means to block the upward social mobility of free people of colour.

The crown also sought to promote change in Spanish America by dissemination of the ideas and projects of the Spanish Enlightenment, through educational reform, scientific missions, support for projects to encourage knowledge and exploitation of the American natural environment, the creation of new merchant organizations, 'economic societies' and a periodical press to act as agencies for change. The dissemination of Enlightenment ideas and practices was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it had positive effects in engendering creole loyalty, as those who favoured innovation came to see the crown as the essential driver for change in deeply conservative societies. However, given that engagement in cultural innovation exposed creoles to ideas that were critical of Spain and, by bringing Spanish Americans into international transfers of ideas and knowledge, it also strengthened a creole sense of an identity separate from but equal to that of peninsular Spaniards. Indeed, the 'creole patriotism' that sprang from defence of the Habsburg pact was sharpened by engagement with 'enlightened' ways of presenting the past and envisaging the future. This did not necessarily encourage sedition. On the contrary, it often promoted collaboration between creole elites and crown officials. But perhaps its most important effect was that, when combined with the periodical press, it stimulated the development of

new sociabilities and small public spheres which fostered habits of debate and criticism, encouraged regional identities, and promoted ideas of meritocracy over aristocracy.

These ideas and sociabilities did not promote revolution, but when Spanish authority collapsed in 1808-14, they provided inspiration and channels for reimagining the monarchy and its future.

**Rebeca Viguera-Ruiz (RVR):** pointed out that, even if the language of democracy is not present much in the earlier period (end of 18<sup>th</sup> C) by the time that Spain moves into the 1860s Latin-America and the Caribbean are being seen as examples of democracy and they influence Spain's attitude to the term.

**John Elliot (JE):** One of the problems is that the liberals of the Cadiz Cortes are really descendants of the Bourbons – they also adopt a very highly centralised view, which is what triggers rebellion in Latin-America, and they keep this centralised view both around 1812-15 and in 1820-23.

**TM:** And they are caught in a really difficult position re Latin America – they risk losing all of America. After 1820, they even consider creating three separate monarchies in Spanish America as a way of preserving Spain's dominance.

**JJ** Think its important to try to get clear what Spanish America and British America are different, if they are. Those in British colonies only became really radical after about 10 years of resistance and struggle; and L-A opposition movements do not last so long, so we can't really see if they might have ended in the same place.

Although the literature talks about the implicit ideologies of crown people relationships in LA, there does not seem to be the kind of articulated, explicit claims that appear in North America. Moreover, in the case of N-A this is linked to a domestic opposition force (and debate) in Britain, that is in close communication with the colonies. There doesn't seem to be a similar movement in Spain, nor similarly close connections.

**JE:** And we have to be clear about the narrowness of the political culture in Spain and the colonies. There is little political culture in LA but there is a language of metropole corruption, and ministerial corruption.

**Maurizio Isabella (MI):** Wondered if the transition from the 18<sup>th</sup> -19<sup>th</sup> C is seen as a major change, or a process of continuity.

**TM:** really a case of continuity, even into Cadiz; although there are tensions within LA languages and assumptions – so that the centralising impulse is also counteracted by a more federal, decentralising liberalism.

**JE** It is striking that Catalan deputies still think of Spain as their *nacion* and are prepared to accept, for all their localism and autonomy, the claims of centralising liberals.

**MI** Did popular political culture change in parallel to elite culture.

**TM:** In Spanish America, like Cataluña, many wanted to sustain relations with Spain and accepted the Cadiz constitutionalist regime rather than support insurgency. With the Hidalgo rebellion in Mexico, we can see a blend of elite and popular political cultures. Hidalgo and his fellow leaders were familiar with Enlightenment ideas, but rarely openly republican. They explicitly accept that

popular support required presentation of rebellion in King's name (the so-called 'Mask of Ferdinand'). Popular rebellion driven more by traditional ideas of defence of community, which continued to surface in 19 c rebellions among indigenous communities. Such rebellions and demands for change are more reflective of ideas of local and community autonomy than European thinking.

**Guy Thomson (GT)** : There are also clear continuities in the indigenous movements across the two centuries.

**Sarah Washbrook (SW)**: One major difference between the British and Spanish cases is that the Spanish empire was much more centralised than the British, and there was more extensive interference by Spain in areas that were deeply significant to people's lives – as in the expulsion of the Jesuits from LA in 1767.

**Alan Knight (AK)** There is a slightly Janus-faced character to liberalism – both centralising and also sympathetic to aspects of federal devolution – there is a federalist liberalism and a Jacobin liberalism. Also, democracy simply doesn't enter into debates in any clear way – what is more important is the existence of a language of legitimacy, and a certain hegemonic language. It is also important to recognise that much of the historiography portrays the Crown as entering something like a structural crisis, in not being able to pull together the disparate components of the colonial world; yet at the same time the Crown remains legitimate or many – certainly more legitimate than the ministers of the crown.

**TM**: Indeed, that is an element of the structural crisis – there are serious structural problems, but what is striking is that when Spain is intensely worried about conspiracies in LA in the 1790s, upon serious investigation the conspiracies tend to vanish – suggesting that there is a higher degree of willing compliance than a focus on rebellion and crisis would imply.

**AK**: Although those close to Buenos Aires might have different views, influenced by developments there?

**TM**: Going back to the question of Spanish intervention, another dimension is the attempt to widen the curricula of the universities and get natural science on the agenda – and that is part of a movement in the late 18<sup>th</sup> C in which elites' frames of reference and sociability begin to expand – so there is an increasingly wide contact with European ideas and exchange of ideas among people outside the locality.

**MP**: Wondered whether the literature on Empire and forum shopping had a relevance here – that the liberal models discussed were essentially central vs federal; but in many empires we see areas of multiple and overlapping jurisdictions which are being disrupted towards the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> C.

**JE**: There are always tensions in composite monarchies, and these are exacerbated by new centralizing ideas but the Spanish monarchy still saw itself and was seen in largely contractual terms – and the expectation of the LA actors was that the old system of give and take would survive and be defended under the new order.

**JJ**: One feature of the British case is that Parliament comes to take a much tougher line in many respects than does the crown – so it's a parliamentary insistence as much as a royal one (in contrast to Spain). There is also no real parallel to the expulsion of the Jesuits – although there is some talk of introducing Bishops into the American colonies, it doesn't go very far at all. And striking cultural differences – for example the interference with the Universities, for which there is no British parallel – suggesting a much more active intervention in L culture than in NA.

Also, wanted to stress that we are not looking for democratic language – especially positive demands for democracy – even in NA this is not a feature of the Revolution but develops subsequently – nonetheless, before then it is a term, and it is used (largely negatively) and is strongly connected to a classical heritage. Does it have that kind of baggage attached in LA.

**TM:** The main use of classical literature is to support monarchy (There is work by Andrew Laird in Warwick in the borrowing of Roman ideas by the conquistadores in the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries. (<http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/arts/classics/staff/andrewlaird>))

**JJ:** Do they use similar examples – do the comuneros?

**EPC:** has looked for evidence of use in newspapers and pamphlets and can only find one example in relation to LA colonial rebellion in the 1770s-90s – and that is in a 1790s newspaper, deeply negative, and strongly linked to events in France. The word is sometimes used also in relation to mixed government. You do see more change in the 1790s.

**TM:** signs, posters etc, before 1794 would have been hand-written.

**AK:** In terms of the language of the protesters – they are more likely to refer to the pueblo, and while they would refer to their local community there is a larger sense of a patria. And that evolving language does imply something like an evolving sense of community and a discourse from below with an element of egalitarianism.

**TM:** Republic is not used much –there are references in the Tupac Amaru rebellion. But the lines between concepts are not sharp.

**SW:** Found useful a comparison with the English Revolution. Also Tupac may have come across the US example and their struggle against the British when in Lima pursuing law suits – which may well have influenced him.

**Peter Hill (PH):** Wondered to what extent is an old style sense of an implicit contract at work here, and to what extent claims about founding documents or legal title through the reference to legal documents or agreements. Is there something like a magna carta, or a Gulhane rescript? Are people able to appeal to something in making a claim?

**EPC** – do the comuneros or does Tupac have a sense of this?

**JE:** Not really a charter, but there is a long standing sense, from Aquinas and Suarez of the responsibilities of the king to his people.

**AK:** although we also need to ask what the weight of this discourse is, and whether people really believe it – or whether it is a Scott ‘transcript’.

**MI:** There is a scholar working on on Alfieri's tragedies in Chile and the extent to which they import a degree of republican language in the 19<sup>th</sup> C (Martin Brown?)

**GT:** It is also important that, once in exile, the Jesuits become a source of anger and resentment, and begin to build opposition.

**Tom Long (TL):** Raised the issue of repertoires of political action – as in Tilly and others); but important to see that these are not fixed but might see innovation – and even if we don't have democracy we can ask if we have innovations in repertoires of political action.

Prompted an interesting discussion on repertoires with TM, TL, AK, EPC, JI, MP, SW, with TM: suggesting that it was not clear that you do get this in the late colonial period, but you do in the early post-colonial period. They begin to draw on other ideas that suit them for other purposes. But there was in the discussion recognition that repertoire's are themselves not fixed like a rule in a game, but more tentatively invoked and less substantial and fixed than often claimed - - AK in the Mexican case in 1810 there's a traditional repertoire, but if enough people begin to invoke it and use it then it begins to change its character. There was a suggestion that Tupac really did move beyond the repertoire, before being repressed and with SW suggesting that Tupac moves to a position that says we need to get rid of the Spanish – so that the objectives begin to change, and things become more fractured and violent as the creoles take a step back. JI made a point about John Bohstedt's critique of Thomson's moral economy in Riot and Community Politics in England and Wales. We need also to recognise that, while difficult to distinguish in practice, analytically innovative vs legitimate and traditional practices are important distinctions to draw. TL also pointed to Tilly's definition of practices as things with a history that people may nonetheless have to improvise with.